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TAXATION-RENTAL DEDUCTION STANDARD EASED FOR GIFT-
LEASEBACK TRANSACTION
Rosenfeld v. Commissioner (2d Cir. 1983)
On July 1, 1969, Dr. George B. Rosenfeld,1 as grantor, transferred the
beneficial ownership of certain real property to a ten and one-half year irrev-
ocable Clifford trust. 2 Rosenfeld retained a reversionary interest in the
corpus of the trust in which his three daughters were named as, beneficiaries,
and his accountant and lawyer were designated as co-trustees.3 Contempo-
raneous with the creation of the trust, Rosenfeld entered into a lease agree-
ment with the trustees to rent the trust property. 4 Pursuant to the terms of
the lease,5 Rosenfeld was required to pay $14,000 per year to the trust, an
amount determined to be the fair rental value of the property.6 In 1973,
Rosenfeld transferred to his wife his reversionary interest in the corpus of the
trust. 7 In 1975, Rosenfeld and the trustees modified the agreement by ex-
tending the termination date of the trust for five years, increasing the annual
rental by $1,000, and extending the rental term for one year with a one-year
option.8 In his returns for the taxable years 1974 and 1975, George Rosen-
1. Rosenfeld v. Commissioner, 706 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1983). George B. Rosen-
feld, a medical doctor, was the taxpayer in this action. Id. at 1278. Harriet Rosen-
feld was also a party to this action because she filed a joint tax return with her
husband. Id n. 1. For purposes of clarity, Dr. and Mrs. Rosenfeld will be referred to
as "Rosenfeld."
2. Id at 1278-79, The real property which is the corpus of the Rosenfeld Clif-
ford trust is located in Cheektowaga, New York. Id at 1278. It was purchased by
George Rosenfeld in 1963. Id. Shortly thereafter, arrangements were made to con-
struct a building on the property which was to be used as a medical office. Id. Ro-
senfeld has been the sole occupant of the building since its completion in 1964. d.
For a discussion of the requirements and purpose of a Clifford trust, see notes 21-24
and accompanying text znfra.
3. 706 F.2d at 1279. The termination date of the trust was set for 1980. Id The
terms of the Clifford trust required Rosenfeld to remain liable for the mortgage pay-
ments and the general upkeep of the property. Id The trust provisions held the
trustees responsible for the payment of real estate taxes. Id Rosenfeld has no unilat-
eral right to alter the terms of the trust. Id. For a discussion of Clifford trusts, see
note 24 and accompanying text igfia.
4. 706 F.2d at 1279. For a discussion of leaseback agreements in the context of a
Clifford trust, see note 24 and accompanying text ifra.
5. 706 F.2d at 1279. The lease was to run for the entire term of the trust. Id
The terms of the lease required Rosenfeld to pay for utilities and other incidental
expenses. Idt t also granted Rosenfeld the right to construct additions to the prop-
erty at his own expense. Id.
6. Id Prior to executing the transaction, Rosenfeld arranged for an independent
appraiser to value the property. d. The fair rental value was calculated based on
the use of all three floors of the building as office space. Id at 1284 (MacMahon, J.,
dissenting). However, Rosenfeld used the third floor for storage only. Id
7. Id at 1279.
8. Id The modification of the trust to extend its termination date and the modi-
(281)
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feld deducted the $14,000 paid under the lease agreement as a business ex-
pense pursuant to section 162(a)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code).9
After an audit, the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service
(Commissioner) disallowed Rosenfeld's rental deductions, claiming that such
payments were not ordinary and necessary business expenses within the
meaning of section 162(a)(3).t0 The Tax Court disagreed with the Commis-
sioner, holding that the rental payments were proper deductions. t t The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit1 2 affirmed, holdtng
that a deduction for rental expenses pursuant to section 162(a)(3) of the
Code is proper where the economic and beneficial rights of a taxpayer are
substantially altered by a gift-leaseback transaction which was otherwise
proper under the Clifford sections of the Code. Rosenfeld v. Commissioner, 706
F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1983).
Section 162(a) of the Code permits a taxpayer to deduct from his per-
sonal income 1 3 those ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred in
fication of the lease agreement to reduce the rental term had the effect of extending
the life of the trust beyond that of the lease. Id. Rosenfeld also held a one-year
option to renew the terms of the rental agreement. Id.
9. Rosenfeld v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1353, 1355 (1982), affd, 706
F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1983). For the text of section 162(a)(3) of the Code, see note 14
and accompanying text zhfra. In 1974, rental payments were made by check directly
to the trustees. 43 T.C.M. at 1355. In 1975, such rental payments were made
through Rosenfeld's payment of $2442.00 in real estate taxes, through his transfer to
the trust of $11,158.87 of securities, and through a cash payment of $399.13. Id.
However, the manner in which payment was made was not an issue on appeal. 706
F.2d at 1279. For the same period, the trust filed fiduciary tax returns and reported
the amount of rent paid by Rosenfeld as income. Id On its fiduciary returns for
1975, the trust also claimed deductions for real estate taxes and depreciation on the
building. Id
10. 43 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1355. Following the Internal Revenue Service audit,
Rosenfeld received a statutory notice of deficiency. 706 F.2d at 1279. In disallowing
the deduction, the Commissioner took the position that a gift-leaseback is a single
transaction, and unless there exists a valid business purpose for the entire arrange-
ment, the transaction should not be recognized. 43 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1356. In lieu
of the rental deduction, the Commissioner was willing to allow Rosenfeld to deduct
the taxes and depreciation attributable to the property. Id at 1355. Rosenfeld chal-
lenged the Commissioner's assessment. 706 F.2d at 1279.
11. 43 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1353. In allowing the rental deductions, the Tax
Court found that the rent paid was reasonable, that a bona fide business purpose
existed for the leaseback, that Rosenfeld did not possess a disqualifying equity inter-
est in the property, and that his control over the property was not substantially the
same as that which existed before the gift was made. Id. at 1357. As a result, the
deficiencies for the years 1974 and 1975 were recalculated and Rosenfeld was held
liable only for non-rental deduction deficiencies. 706 F.2d at 1279.
12. The case was heard by Judges Kaufman and Kearse and Judge MacMahon
of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by
designation. Judge Kaufman wrote the majority opinion and Judge MacMahon
dissented.
13. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1982). These deductions are not direct deductions against
the taxpayer's gross income, but may be applied only against income received by the
taxpayer in operating a trade or business as a sole proprietorship. Thus, the net
income from the trade or business is reported on the personal return as "income
[Vol. 29: p. 281
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carrying on a trade or business.' 4 To be deductible under this section, an
expense must meet the following requirements: 1) it must be paid or in-
curred during the year in connection with a trade or business;1 5 2) it must be
a business rather than a personal expense; 16 3) it must be a current expense,
not a capital outlay; 17 and 4) it must be ordinary and necessary. 18
received from a trade or business." For the text of section 162(a)(3) of the Code, see
note 14 infra.
14. 706 F.2d at 1279. Section 162(a) provides in pertinent part as follows:
There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade
or business including
(3) Rental and other payments required to be made as a condi-
tion to the continued use or possession for purposes of trade or business, of
property to which the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking title in which
he has no equity.
I.R.C. § 162(a)(3) (1982).
15. Although the Code has never defined "trade or business," different tests
have been developed by the different circuits to determine whether a trade or busi-
ness exists. However, the Supreme Court, in addressing this issue, stated, "To deter-
mine whether the activities of a taxpayer are 'carrying on a business' requires an
examination of the facts in each case. . . .The Bureau of Internal Revenue has this
duty of determining what is carrying on a business, subject to reexamination of the
facts by the Board of Tax Appeals and ultimately to review on the law by the courts
in which jurisdiction is conferred." Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212, 217-18
(1941). This adhoc determination has led to the exercise of different tests among the
circuits as to what constitutes carrying on a trade or business. For example, the
Third Circuit looked to the dictionary, and concluded that "business" meant "that
which busies or engages time, attention or labor as a principal serious concern or
interest; any particular occupation ...for livelihood or gain." DuPont v. Deputy,
103 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1939), rev'd on other grounds, 308 U.S. 488 (1940). The Sixth
Circuit has defined "business" to be a very comprehensive term, embracing every-
thing about which a person could be employed, and as that which occupies time,
attention, and labor for the purpose of livelihood or profit. Kales v. Commissioner,
101 F.2d 35 (6th Cir. 1937). Finally, the Second Circuit has held: "By the common
speech of men, a person who does nothing beyond looking after his own investments
and receiving the income from them is not conducting a trade or business." Higgins,
111 F.2d at 796-97.
16. See I.R.C. § 162 (1982). See also I.R.C. § 262 (1982) (providing that no de-
duction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses). The requirement
that the expense be business, as opposed to personal in nature, requires a direct and
proximate relationship between the business and the purpose of the expenditure.
Freedman v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1962) (costs incurred in settling a
lawsuit against taxpayer for personal injuries resulting from an auto accident while
driving between two jobs not proximately connected to either job and thus not de-
ductible). Cf Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145 (1928) (allowing expenses
incurred in defending an action brought by a former business partner to be deducted
as trade and business expenses).
17. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1982). See also I.R.C. § 263 (1982) (no deduction shall be
allowed for payments which increase the value of any property).
18. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933). The terms "ordinary and neces-
sary" have been defined by the courts as those expenses which need not "be habitual
or normal in the sense that the same taxpayer will have to make them often," but
those which "because we know from experience that payments for such a purpose,
• ..are the common and accepted means of defense against attack." Id at 114.
Welch involved a taxpayer who was in business as a commission agent for a corpora-
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Embraced within the ambit of section 162(a) are rental payments in-
curred as a necessary cost of carrying on a taxpayer's business. 19 To take
advantage of this provision, taxpayers frequently entered into gift-leaseback
agreements, 20 transactions in which a taxpayer makes a gift of property to
another, and subsequently leases the property back to himself. As a result,
the taxpayer becomes obligated to pay rent on property which he previously
owned. The taxpayer then deducts these rental payments under section
162(a)(3), thereby reducing his taxable income. 2 1 The recipient and subse-
quently, the lessor of the property, in a gift-leaseback arrangement is often a
trust.
2 2
tion that had gone into bankruptcy. Id After the company had been adjudged
bankrupt and its debts had been discharged, the taxpayer paid creditors of the bank-
rupt corporation in an attempt to fortify his individual standing and credit. Id at
112. The taxpayer then deducted these payments on his personal income tax returns
as ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in his business. Id at 113. The Supreme
Court disallowed the deduction, noting that "[m]en do at times pay the debts of
others without legal obligation, . . . but they do not do so ordinarily." Id at 114.
Ordinary expenses have been held to include expenses incurred in the defense of
a criminal charge growing out of the business of the taxpayer, and payments of debts
discharged in bankruptcy, but subject to being revived by force of a new promise.
Commissioner v. People's-Pittsburgh Trust Co., 60 F.2d 187 (1932). See also Midland
Empire Packing Co., 15 T.C. 635 (1950). The term "carrying on" a trade or business
has been defined to allow as a deduction expenses incurred if the taxpayer is already
engaged in a trade or business. Morton Frank v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 511 (1953).
In Morton Frank, the Tax Court disallowed expenses incurred by taxpayers in search
of business, stating, "[E]xpenses of investigating and looking for a new business . . .
are not deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense incurred in carrying
on a trade or business." Id at 513. See also Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 505 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974).
19. I.R.C. § 162(a)(3) (1982).
20. For a detailed discussion of taxpayers' efforts to reduce income through the
execution of gift-leaseback arrangements, see Comment, Gijf-Leaseback Transactions.
An Unpredictable Tax-Savings Tool, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 569 (1980).
21. For a detailed discussion of the effect of a gift-leaseback arrangement on tax
minimization, see Froehlich, Clifford Trusts: Use of Partnership Interests as Corpus, Lease-
back Arrangements, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 956 (1964). This author suggests that because
this transaction attempts to reduce family taxes by income-splitting, failure of the
plan merely relegates the taxpayer to the same position which he occupied before the
leaseback arrangement. Id. The author argues that if the deduction is denied, the
rental payments will be viewed as a gift to the trust. This gift will presumably not
constitute income. Id at 976-77. Consequently, the author contends that the Clif-
ford trust leaseback plan falls into the category of "what do you have to lose?" Id. As
noted by the author, however, the test for income realization from the alleged gift to
the trust is not related to the test for deductibility of rent to the taxpayer. Id For a
discussion of the Clifford rules as a standard for determining income realization, see
Cohen, Transfers and Leasebacks to Trusts: Tax and Planning Considerations, 43 VA. L.
REv. 31, 41 (1957). See also Note, Gifts and Leasebacks: Isjudicial Consensus Impossible.;,
49 U. CIN. L. REV. 379 (1980).
22. A trust is a "fiduciary relationship in which one person is the holder of the
title to property subject to an equitable obligation to keep or use the property for the
benefit of another." G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS 1 (5th ed. 1973)
(footnote omitted). The settlor of a trust "is the person who intentionally causes the
trust to come into existence." Id. The trustee "is the person who holds title for the
benefit of another." Id The trust property "is the property interest which the trustee
(Vol. 29: p. 281
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The most common type of gift-leaseback agreement involves the trans-
fer of real property by the taxpayer to a Clifford trust,23 an irrevocable trust
that must exist for a minimum ten-year period, and which allows the income
derived from the property to be taxed to the trust.24 The Internal Revenue
Service (Service) has not looked favorably upon taxpayers' efforts to claim a
business deduction for rental payments made to a family trust under a gift-
leaseback arrangement. 25 Taxpayers have argued that these deductions
should be allowed if the Clifford trust has been executed according to the
Clifford provisions of the Code. 26 In response, the Commissioner has argued
that the United States Treasury Regulations indicate that the Clifford trust
requirements are not to be used by the Service to determine whether a tax-
payer may deduct rental payments to a trust pursuant to a gift-leaseback
arrangement. 27 Rather, the Commissioner has argued, the Clifford trust re-
holds subject to the rights of another." Id The beneficiary "is the person for whose
benefit the trust property is to be held by the trustee." Id at 2. The trust instrument
"is the document by which property interests are vested in the trustee and beneficiary
and the rights and duties of the parties (called the trust terms) are set forth." Id. See
also Keplinger v. Keplinger, 185 Ind. 81, 85, 113 N.E. 292, 293 (1916).
23. The Clifford trust was judicially created. See Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S.
331 (1940). In Clird, a husband-taxpayer declared himself the trustee of certain
securities for the benefit of his wife for a period of five years. Id at 332. The tax-
payer retained complete control over the principal fund. Id at 332-33. The income
from the trust was to be distributed to the taxpayer's wife. Id. at 332. Subsequently,
the taxpayer attempted to reduce his tax liability by claiming that the income should
be taxed to the beneficiary and not to him. Id at 333-34. The Supreme Court dis-
agreed, holding that the execution of the trust had not changed the taxpayer's posi-
tion. Id. at 335. The Court stated, "When the benefits flowing to him indirectly
through the wife are added to the legal rights he retained, the aggregate may be said
to be a fair equivalent of what he previously had." Id at 336.
24. In direct response to the Clird decision, the Treasury Department promul-
gated the Clifford regulations. These regulations were incorporated into the 1954
Code. See I.R.C. §§ 671-678 (1982). The Clifford provisions require that in order for
income to be taxed to the beneficiary rather than the grantor, the trust must be
irrevocable; any reversionary interest retained by the grantor may not take effect
within 10 years from the execution of the trust or before the death of the income
beneficiary; the grantor may not retain any administrative powers; and the trust
corpus may not be used or the income accumulated to the grantor or his spouse to
discharge their obligations. Id §§ 673, 675-677(a).
25. Comment, supra note 20, at 570-71. As a result of this hostility, the gift-
leaseback has been designated a "prime issue" by the Internal Revenue Service.
"Prime issues" are areas which are given close scrutiny by the IRS, and as a result,
such cases are litigated rather than settled or conceded. Internal Revenue Service
Manual, MT-1277-8 No. 0671.01-01 (Nov. 19, 1974). As a result, the amount of
Clifford-related litigation has increased, while the number of settlements have de-
creased. Id The inconsistent approaches employed by the courts in evaluating the
legitimacy of these deductions have compounded the problem. Comment, supra note
20, at 570. See also Pratt & Bell, Trust-Leaseback Arrangements: Where Do They Stand?,
120 TR. & EST. 45 (Jan. 1981).
26. See, e.g., Froehlich,supra note 21, at 973-74; Note, Cbffird Trusts: A New View
Towards Leaseback Deductions, 43 ALB. L. REV. 585, 594-95 (1979). For a discussion of
the effect of compliance with the Clifford provisions on leasebacks, see Note, supra
note 21, at 393-94.
27. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.,repr'ntedin 1954 U.S. CODE CONG.
5
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quirements are to be used to determine whether the income from the trust
should be taxed to the trust or the grantor.2 8 However, several courts have
ignored the Service's admonition, employing Clifford-type considerations to
determine whether a rental payment satisfies the provisions of section
162(a) (3).29
In 1973, these judicially-adopted Clifford-type considerations became
embodied in a four-prong test in the case of Mathews v. Commissioner,30 in
which the Tax Court endeavored to evaluate the legitimacy of rental deduc-
tions taken following a gift-leaseback arrangement. The Tax Court stated
that in order for such rental payments to be deductible, the gift-leaseback
transaction most meet the following requirements: 1) the grantor must not
have retained substantially the same control over the property that he had
before he made the gift; 2) the leaseback agreement should be in writing;
3) the leaseback (as distinguished from the gift) must have a bona fide busi-
&AD. NEWS 4621, 5006; 26 C.F.R. § 1.671-1(c) (1982) (these sections have "no appli-
cation in determining the right of a grantor to deductions for payments to a trust
under a transfer and leaseback arrangement"). See also Perry v. United States, 520
F.2d 235, 238 (4th Cir. 1975) (although a Clifford trust had been validly executed,
there was no business purpose for this execution and therefore, no deduction was
allowed), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1976).
28. Compliance thus enables the grantor to shift income to the trust benefi-
ciaries, who will be taxed at lower rates than the grantor.
29. See Quinlivan v. Commissioner, 599 F.2d 269 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S.
996 (1979); Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814
(1950). These considerations generally track the analysis used by the Court in Clif-
ford. Although the courts have analyzed compliance with §§ 671-678 of the Code,
they have scrutinized the grantor's dominion and control on a much stricter level.
For example, the Clifford provisions of the Code allow a taxpayer to appoint himself,
or other members of his family as trustee. I.R.C. §§ 671-678 (1982). Courts, how-
ever, have disallowed a rental deduction for Clifford trusts where the taxpayer or a
member of his family serves as trustee. See Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965) (rental deduction disallowed where tax-
payer-grantor named himself as trustee because trustee lacked the requisite indepen-
dence). Retention of the reversionary interest is also allowed under the Clifford
provisions, yet has led the Tax Court to disallow the deduction. See Armston v. Com-
missioner, 12 T.C. 539'(1949), affd, 188 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1951); Brown v. Commis-
sioner, 12 T.C. 1095 (1949), rev'd, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814
(1950); Skemp v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 415 (1947), rev'd, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.
1948). For a discussion of courts' attempts to employ Clifford-type considerations in
determining whether rental payments satisfy section 162(a), see Comment, supra note
20, at 570.
30. 61 T.C. 12 (1973), rev'd, 520 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
967 (1976). In Mathews, the Tax Court consolidated requirements which it had an-
nounced in prior decisions. 61 T.C. at 18-19. See Penn v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.
144, 150 (1968); Oakes v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 524 (1965); Van Zandt v. Commis-
sioner, 40 T.C. 824, aftd, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965). For
example, the first prong, control, found its basis in Van Zandl. 40 T.C. at 831. The
second prong, the writing requirement, was first enunciated in Penn. 51 T.C. at 144.
The valid business purpose prong was based upon the holding of Oakes. 44 T.C. at
524. The fourth requirement, however, found its basis within the language of section
162(a)(3) of the Code. I.R.C. § 162(a)(3) (1982). See also May v. Commissioner, 76
T.C. 713 (1981); Quinlivan v. Commissioner, 599 F.2d 269, 272 (8th Cir.), cerl. denied,
444 U.S. 996 (1979).
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ness purpose; and 4) the grantor may not possess a disqualifying "equity" in
the property within the meaning of section 162(a)(3). 31
In analyzing the first prong of the Tax Court test, courts have generally
equated relinquishment of control by the grantor with independence of the
trustee. Therefore, inquiry has focused on the degree of independence of the
trustee.3 2 The important factors which both the Tax Court and the courts of
appeals have considered in determining whether the trustee is independent
include the following: (1) the identity of the trustee; (2) the pre-arrangement
of the leaseback; and (3) the powers retained by the grantor.3 3
31. Mathews, 61 T.C. at 12. For a discussion of various courts' analyses of the
first prong, see text accompanying notes 34-48 infra. For a discussion of the various
courts' analyses of the second prong, see text accompanying notes 49-52 infra. For a
discussion of the various courts' analyses under the third prong, see text accompany-
ing notes 53-72 infia. For a discussion of various courts' analyses under the fourth
prong, see text accompanying notes 73-86 in/a.
32. 61 T.C. at 13. The inquiry into the independence of the trustee is grounded
upon the belief that if a trustee is indeed independent, his fiduciary obligation will
compel him to act in the best interests of the beneficiaries. Thus, the grantor will not
be able to exert undue influence over the property, and will have thus relinquished
control. Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440, 443 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 814 (1965). Where a grantor has appointed himself trustee, courts have consist-
ently held that he lacked sufficient independence to allow a rental deduction. See, e.g,
Wiles v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 289, afdmem., 491 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1974). The
courts have reasoned that where the grantor has named himself as trustee, there is no
independence because the principal amount of the trust is simply transferred from
the grantor in his individual capacity to himself as trustee. Van Zandi, 341 F.2d at
443. Cf Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 1972) (where a gran-
tor serves as trustee pursuant to a court appointment, the court has found the requi-
site independence and the business deduction has been allowed).
In analyzing trustee independence, some courts have examined the nature of the
relationship between the grantor and the trustee. These cases assume retention of
control by the grantor where because of a family or similar relationship there exists a
strong possibility of grantor dominance over the trustee. See Furman v. Commis-
sioner, 45 T.C. 360 (1966) (rental deduction denied where grantor's wife named as
trustee). See also White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951) (rental deduction
denied where wife, as donee of business property, acquiesced in the husband-donor's
management of the property), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 928 (1952); Chace v, United
States, 303 F. Supp. 513 (M.D. Fla. 1969) (rental deduction denied where grantor's
equitable interest in the trust property denied his wife and friend, as trustees, of in-
dependent management of the property), af'd per curtaim, 422 F.2d 292 (5th Cir.
1970). Other courts have scrutinized objective circumstances surrounding the trans-
action. These circumstances include not only the terms of the trust and lease agree-
ments, but also the amount of rent paid and whether the lease was prearranged. See
Mathews v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 12, 18 (1973), rev'd, 520 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976). For a more detailed discussion of the courts' varying
approaches to this issue, see Note, supra note 26, at 393-94.
33. Comment, supra note 20, at 575-77. The courts have closely scrutinized
trustee independence in the belief that granting control and ownership to an in-
dependent trustee is "strongly indicative of the bona fides of the transfer." Oakes v.
Commissioner, 44 T.C. at 529 (1965). See generally Felix v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.
794 (1954). The Seventh Circuit has also allowed the deduction although the lease-
back situation was voluntarily created by the taxpayer, in the belief that the indepen-
dence of the trustee required him to exact rent and required the same payment by
the taxpayer. Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 1948). For a
1983-84]
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In analyzing the identity of the trustee, courts have scrutinized gift-
leaseback transactions to determine whether there exists a relationship be-
tween the grantor and trustee which would allow the grantor to exert control
over the property. Accordingly, the Tax Court has consistently found that a
taxpayer-grantor lacks the requisite independence to serve as trustee. 34 The
federal courts have also been unwilling to find the requisite trustee indepen-
dence in the leaseback context where a familial relationship exists between
the grantor and the trustee. For example, in Chace v. United Staes ,35 the Fifth
Circuit held that where the grantor named his wife and brother-in-law as co-
trustees, the business deduction should be disallowed because the close rela-
tionship between the trustee and grantor barred the trustee from being com-
pletely independent. 36 On the other hand, several other circuit courts of
further discussion of the effects of trustee independence on rental deductions, see
Duffy v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 4 (S.D. Ohio 1972). See also Brown v. Commis-
sioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950).
34. See, e.g., Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 824 (1964)(where property
was conveyed to the trustee, and the trustee was the original grantor, "the whole
principal amount of the trust was irrevocably committed to the possession of the
grantor the moment the trust was created"), aj'd, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 814 (1965); Penn v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 144, 154 (1968) (where grantor
named himself as trustee, there was no "complete divestiture by the grantor of his
interest in the trust property to a new, 'independent' owner"). Although the Tax
Court has disallowed the rental deduction where the grantor has named himself as
trustee, the Treasury Regulations dealing with the requirements of a Clifford trust do
not prohibit a grantor from appointing himself as trustee. Treas. Reg. § 1.671-1 T.D.
7741 (1980). This incongruity between the Tax Court and the Treasury Department
may indirectly induce a taxpayer to name himself as trustee in the belief that his
compliance with the Clifford provisions will allow a rental deduction. See note 29
and accompanying text supra.
35. 303 F. Supp. 513 (M.D. Fla. 1969), aJ'dper curiam, 422 F.2d 292 (5th Cir.
1970). In Chace, the taxpayer-settlor executed a trust for 10 years and one day, nam-
ing his wife and brother-in-law as co-trustees and his children as beneficiaries. 303 F.
Supp. at 513. The corpus of the trust consisted of an office building used by the
settlor in his dentistry practice. Id at 513-14. After executing the trust, the settlor
entered into a lease agreement with the trustees for a three-year period. Id. at 514.
The agreement contained an option clause which allowed the settlor-lessee to renew
the lease for three additional periods of three years, with each period at the same rent
as the original term. Id. The Commissioner disallowed the rental deduction on Dr.
Chace's return, holding that the execution of the trust was a sham. Id. at 514-15.
The district court agreed, quoting Judge Tuttle in Van Zandt: "[I]t seems clear that
we do not have the normal relationship that exists when an 'independent' trust is
created . . . ." Id. at 516 (quoting Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440, 443
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965)).
36. Id. The Tax Court has, however, allowed the deduction where the familial
trustee was a co-trustee with the grantor's accountant. Potter v. Commissioner, 27
T.C. 200 (1956). In Potter, the taxpayer created irrevocable trusts for his wife and
minor children. Id at 203. He then transferred to the trusts the right, title, and
interest to a certain patent application. Id. At the time the trusts were executed, the
trustees entered into a nonexclusive license agreement with the taxpayer whereby the
taxpayer, in exchange for a royalty, could make, use, and sell the article under pat-
ent. Id at 204. The taxpayer then deducted the royalty payments under
§ 23(a)(1)(A) of the 1939 Code (subsequently revised and presently codified at IRC
§ 162(a) (1982)). The Commissioner disallowed the deduction, arguing that the roy-
alty payments were not ordinary and necessary. Id at 213. The Tax Court disagreed
[Vol. 29: p. 281
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appeals have allowed the deduction where the grantor has appointed a
trustee who was not a member of the grantor's family. In Brown V. Commis-
sioner,37 the Third Circuit allowed a deduction where the grantor's attorney
was appointed as trustee. 38 Similarly, in Quinlivan v. Commissioner,39 the
Eighth Circuit found sufficient independence and therefore, allowed a de-
duction where a bank was appointed as trustee. 40
The question of whether the leaseback agreement was arranged prior to
the execution of the trust may play an important role in determining
whether the trustee is independent. The Fourth and Seventh Circuits have
examined this issue and have reached conflicting results. In Perry v. United
States,41 the terms of the leaseback, including the trustee's duties as lessor,
were arranged prior to the execution of the trust. The Fourth Circuit disal-
lowed the deduction since all the trustee's duties had been predetermined,
and allowed the deduction. Id at 216. In analyzing the independence of trustees,
the Tax Court acknowledged the relationship between the trustees and the settlor,
but concluded without elaborate inquiry that the trustees were independent. Id at
213. See also May v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 7 (1981) (rental deduction allowed where
taxpayer was co-trustee with a friend who had served as trustee of other trusts).
37. 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950). In Brown, the tax-
payers, husband and wife, were engaged as partners in the general contracting and
coal mining business. Id at 927. The taxpayers executed a trust whereby title to
land which they used in business was transferred to a trustee with the understanding
that the property was to be leased to the taxpayers. Id
38. Id. at 929. In holding that the trustee possessed the requisite independence,
the court observed that the controlling factor was the existence of a new independent
owner, the trustee. Id The Brown court based this holding on the fiduciary obliga-
tion of the trustee to exact the rental payments from the taxpayer as a condition to
the continued use of the land. Id
39. 599 F.2d 269 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). In Quiniwan, tax-
payers were two attorneys engaged in a partnership in the practice of law. Id at 271.
In January 1964, each taxpayer executed irrevocable trusts for a period of 10 and
one-half years. Each taxpayer transferred his one-half interest in the office building
which they had owned as tenants in common. Id. A bank was named as trustee. Id
Shortly thereafter, the taxpayers and the trustee entered into a lease agreement to
lease the property to the law firm. Id. The law firm deducted the rental payments
made to the trustee. Id
40. Id at 272. In holding that the trustee was indeed independent, the Eighth
Circuit relied on the fact that the law firm was obligated to pay rent under the writ-
ten lease. Id. The court reasoned that, had these rental payments not been made by
the law firm, the bank as trustee would have been under a fiduciary obligation to
evict the law firm or sue the firm for the rent due. Id See also Skemp v. Commis-
sioner, 168 F.2d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 1948). For a further discussion of the analysis in
Quinlhvan, see Note, Quinlivan Provides Gi2-Leaseback Guidelines: Quinlivan v. Com-
missioner, 26 ST. Louis U.L.J. 203 (1981).
41. 520 F.2d 235 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1975). In Perry, the tax-
payers were two physicians who had formed a medical partnership. Id at 236. They
acquired land as tenants in common, constructed an office on it, and used it for their
medical practice. Id Five years later, each taxpayer transferred his one-half interest
in the property to a Clifford trust for the benefit of his children. Id. at 236-37. A
bank was named as trustee. Id at 237. Prior to the conveyance of the property to the
trustee, a leaseback was arranged, and the trusts and leases were executed contempo-
raneously. Id
1983-84]
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and there were no powers in the trustee to manage the property. 42 However,
in Skemp v. Commissioner,43 the Seventh Circuit allowed the rental deduction,.
despite the fact that the leaseback had been prearranged.
44
A final factor which has weighed heavily in courts' evaluation of the
independence of the trustee is the scope of powers which the grantor retains
over the trust property. For example, in Hall v. United Stales,45 the grantor
retained the right to settle accounts. The District Court for the Northern
District of New York disallowed the deduction under these circumstances,
citing a lack of trustee independence. 46 Similarly, in Furman v. Commis-
stoner,4 7 the grantor retained the power to prohibit the sale of the property.
42. Id. at 238. The taxpayers in Perry relied heavily upon a Seventh Circuit
decision in which the court allowed a rental deduction despite the existence of a pre-
arranged leaseback. Id at 237 (citing Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.
1948)). The taxpayers attempted to distinguish Skemp from Van Zand v. Commissioner,
where the grantor named himself as trustee, claiming that the main distinction be-
tween the two cases was the existence of a corporate trustee. 529 F.2d at 237 (citing
Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814
(1965)). However, the Perry court reasoned that the facts at bar were indistinguish-
able from those in Van Zandt, because in both cases the trustee had nothing to do with
the management of the trust. Id. at 237-38. However, the Third Circuit, faced with
a similar pre-arranged leaseback transaction, held just the opposite of Perry. See
Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950). In
allowing the deduction, the court stated as follows: "It is true that this was done
pursuant to a prior understanding between the taxpayers and the prospective trustee
but we do not regard this point as significant." Id. at 929. For a further discussion of
the Fourth Circuit's analysis in Perry, see Shurtz & Harmelink, Trust-Leasebacks after
Quinlivan, 16 CAL. W.L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1980).
43. 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948). In Skemp, the taxpayer, a physician, con-
ducted his medical practice in a two-story office building which he owned. Id. at 599.
The taxpayer created a trust for the benefit of his wife and children by conveying the
property to the La Crosse Trust Company as sole trustee. Id On the same day, the
trustee and the taxpayer entered into a lease for a ten-year period. Id
44. Id at 600. In finding that the trustee was independent, the court relied on
the fact that the trustee was bound by his fiduciary duty to exact rent from the
taxpayer, and that the taxpayer was equally bound to pay the rent. Id. The court
made no mention of the effect of the pre-arranged leaseback on the trustee's execu-
tion of his fiduciary obligations. See also Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3d
Cir.) (deduction allowed: the existence of a new independent owner, the trustee, was
the controlling factor, not the pre-arranged leaseback), cert. deni'd, 340 U.S. 814
(1950). For a discussion of the analysis used by the Seventh Circuit in Skemp, see
Pratt & Bell, supra note 25, at 47.
45. 208 F. Supp. 584 (N.D.N.Y. 1962). In Hall, three doctors were engaged in a
medical partnership. Id. at 585-86. Each doctor executed a trust, transferring his
one-third interest in the property to the Tompkins County Trust Company, as
trustee, for the benefit of his children. Id. at 586. Two days later, the trustee leased
the property to the three doctors. Id. The grantors retained the power to ultimately
dispose of the corpus of the trusts, and to settle the accounts of the trustee. Id
46. Id. at 587. In discussing the grantor's reserved right to settle tie accounts of
the trustee, the court stated as follows: "[I]t is plain that by this device, the grantors
retained an effective means of control over the actions of the trustee." Id Therefore,
the court concluded that a trustee cannot be wholly independent where the grantor
had a reversionary interest and the right to settle accounts. d. at 588.
47. 45 T.C. 360 (1966). In Furman, the taxpayer transferred property he owned
to a Clifford trust for the benefit of his children. Id at 361. Simultaneously, the
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The Tax Court disallowed the deduction in the belief that the grantor's re-
tention of these powers negatived any economic reality as to the existence of
an independent trustee. 48
The second prong of the Tax Court's test suggests that the lease should
be in writing and that the payment of rent must be reasonable. 49 A written
lease, though not an absolute prerequisite, 50 may be evidence of a legally
binding relationship between the trustee and the grantor requiring the
trustee to perform certain obligations for the benefit of the trust's benefi-
ciaries. 51 The emphasis on a reasonable rent is based upon the notion that
an arms-length transaction between the grantor and an independent trustee
is the only guarantee of a reasonable rental agreement. 52
trustee and the grantor entered into a leaseback agreement. Id The taxpayer, after
giving the trustee broad powers to deal with the trust property, withdrew the trustee's
power to sell the significant corpus of the trust without his permission. Id at 364-65.
Although the court noted that its decision was not premised on the grantor's reten-
tion of control, it did find that this control, coupled with other factors, made the
entire transaction illusory. Id at 366. The court reasoned that after the transaction
the grantor was in the same economic position as he was before the execution of the
trust. Id Where the grantor's powers over the corpus are substantially the same
after the execution of the trust as before it, the Tax Court has held the entire transac-
tion to "lack economic reality." See, e.g., Wiles v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 289 (1972)
(the informality of the rent arrangement was found to be indicative of the taxpayer's
retention of control and thus the transaction lacked economic reality), aj'd mem., 491
F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1974); Penn v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 144 (1968) (grantor as sole
trustee could sell, exchange, or rent the property, and therefore the economic reality
was that the grantor retained control of the property).
48. Furman, 45 T.C. at 366.
49. Mathews, 61 T.C. at 18. For the other requirements of the four-prong test,
see text accompanying note 31 supra.
50. One of the collateral requirements of the four-prong test is that the lease
should normally be in writing. See Mathews, 61 T.C. at 18.
51. Skemp, 168 F.2d at 598. The Skemp court noted that the lease arrangement
obligated the taxpayer to pay, and the trustee to collect, the rent. Id at 600.
52. Audano v. United States, 428 F.2d 251, 257 (5th Cir. 1970). In Audano, a
taxpayer acquired certain equipment in the course of his medical practice. Id at 254.
Subsequently, the taxpayer entered into a partnership with two other doctors. Id
The taxpayer then transferred title to this equipment to three trusts established for
the benefit of his children. Id The trustees then leased the property to the partner-
ship. Id at 255. No written lease existed. Id During the five-year period, 1958-
1962, the partnership paid approximately $58,000, or an average $11,700 annually,
for use of the equipment. Id at 257. However, the equipment cost the taxpayer no
more than $15,000. Id In 1961, the rental fee was changed to 5-10% of the partner-
ship's gross receipts. Id No evidence was offered as to the going rate for similar
equipment. Id Based on these facts, in disallowing the deduction, the Audano court
found that the rent paid was unreasonable in relation to the transaction's stated pur-
pose. Id at 257. This finding was premised on the belief that the rental percentages
were not determined as a result of arm's-length negotiations regarding the rental
value of the equipment, but were instead established as a condition of taxpayer's
continuation as the principal income-producing member of the partnership. Id The
Audano court held that because the taxpayer failed to rebut the presumption of un-
reasonable rent, the government was entitled to a judgment without submission of
the issue to the jury. Id It appears, therefore, that the existence of an arm's-length
bargaining transaction negates the possibility of overlapping interests between the
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The third element under the Tax Court's test requires that there be a
valid business purpose for the gift-leaseback transaction. 53 However, courts
are split as to what aspects of the transaction must meet this condition. One
approach to this question, utilized by the Fifth Circuit in Van Zand v. Com-
missioner,54 may be referred to as the "single transaction business test."' 55 In
Van Zandi, the Fifth Circuit viewed the gift-leaseback arrangement as one
integrated transaction, and consequently required that a valid business pur-
pose exist for both the conveyance of the property to the trust and the subse-
quent leaseback. 56 Because the trust property was transferred from the
taxpayer as an individual to himself as trustee,5 7 the court reasoned that the
original conveyance and leaseback must be viewed as one single
transaction.
58
trustee and the grantor. At least one court has disallowed the deduction where the
rental payments were varied and sporadic, thus lacking the indicia of an arm's-length
bargaining transaction. See Wiles v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 289 (1972), aj'd mer.,
491 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1974). In Wiles, the court found that the informality of the
rent arrangement was indicative of the fact that no formal relationship existed be-
tween the taxpayer and the trustee, and therefore the taxpayers had retained control
over the property. Id. at 298.
53. Mathews, 61 T.C. at 13. For a discussion of the other requirements of the
four-prong test, see text accompanying note 31 supra.
54. 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965).
55. Cf Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). In Gregory, the taxpayer
owned all the shares of the United Mortgage Corp., whose assets included shares of
Monitor Securities Corp. It became possible to sell these Monitor shares at a large
profit, but such a sale would have resulted in the imposition of a capital gains tax on
United Mortgage, and another tax on the taxpayer when the profits were distributed
to her in the form of dividends. Id at 467. To reduce these taxes, the taxpayer
incorporated a new company called the Averill Corp. Id United Mortgage Corp.
then transferred all of the Monitor Securities shares to Averill, and Averill trans-
ferred all of its shares to the taxpayer. Id Three days later, the taxpayer wound up
the Averill Corp., received the Monitor shares as the liquidating dividend, and then
sold the shares. Id In holding that no valid reorganization existed, the Supreme
Court found that it was necessary to scrutinize the entire transaction in order to
determine if what was done, apart from the tax motive, was within the ambit of the
statute. Id at 469.
56. 341 F.2d at 443. The Fifth Circuit rejected the bifurcated approach which
had been utilized by the Tax Court and advocated by the taxpayer. Id at 442. The
Tax Court had declined to consider the business validity of the conveyance of the
property to the trust, and focused solely on whether the rental payments were ordi-
nary and necessary. Id In adopting its integrated analysis, the Fifth Circuit noted
that to adopt the Tax Court's approach would be to ratify schemes which should
really be viewed as subterfuges for tax purposes. Id (citing W.H. Armston Co. v.
Commissioner, 188 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1951)).
57. In Van Zandt, taxpayer named himself as trustee of two irrevocable trusts,
one for each of his children. Id at 441. On the day he created the trusts, Dr. Van
Zandt executed two lease agreements under which he leased back from the trustee
the corpus of the trust, a medical building in which Dr. Van Zandt practiced. Id
58. Id at 443. After noting that the grantor and the trustee were one and the
same, the court stated, "Thus, it seems to us inevitably we must look at the original
conveyance of the property together with the execution of the leaseback as a single
transaction." Id However, it was not clear whether the court would have applied
this test had the grantor not named himself as the trustee. The language of the opin-
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Other circuits have viewed the transaction as bifurcated, distinguishing
the gift from the leaseback.59 These circuits only examine the leaseback to
determine whether a valid business purpose exists.6° This analysis has be-
come known as the "necessity of expense test. '"61 The first reported gift-
leaseback case to apply the necessity of expense test was Skemp v. Commis-
si'oner.62 In Skemp, a doctor transferred his ownership of a medical building
to a trust in which his children were named as beneficiaries. 63 On the day
the trust was created, the taxpayer entered into an agreement to lease the
ion suggests that because the grantor retained complete control over the corpus at the
time the trust was executed, a closer analysis into the original gift was required. See
id at 443. However, in discussing the Van Zandt decision, the Fifth Circuit stated,
The outcome would not have differed had there been an outside independ-
ent trustee. We think Van Zandt teaches that it is not sufficient merely to
serve up some 'business purpose' as some of the cases put it. The fact tax-
payers can conjure up some reason why a businessman would enter into this
sort of arrangement-tax consequences aside-does not foreclose inquiry.
Rather there must be "economic reality."
Mathews, 520 F.2d at 325 (citations omitted).
59. See Quinlian, 599 F.2d at 269; Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950); Skemp, 168 F.2d at 598.
60. See, e.g., Quinlivan, 599 F.2d at 269. In Quin/ivan, the Eighth Circuit recog-
nized that the overall transaction need not be considered. Id at 273. The Quinlivan
court stated as follows: "[Tihe Congress has specified that the business purpose test is
concerned with the 'continued use or possession' of the property. There is no justifi-
cation for adding an inquiry into the origin of the lessor's title in applying this re-
quirement." Id The necessity of expense test has also been applied by the Third
Circuit. Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814
(1950). In Brown, the Commissioner argued that the gift of the property was indica-
tive of the taxpayer's voluntary creation of an obligation to pay rent. Id. at 929.
However, the court held that the only question to be decided was the deduction of
rental payments from gross income, and that the gift of the property was irrelevant to
that determination. Id See also Skemp, 168 F.2d at 598 (gift of property found to be
irrelevant in determining the deductibility of rental payments made to a trust).
61. Skemp, 168 F.2d at 598. Where the single transaction business purpose test is
applied, the taxpayer generally has the burden of proving the existence of a valid
business purpose for the initial gift. Taxpayers have encountered many difficulties in
attempting to justify their gifts on acceptable business grounds because there is rarely
a good business reason for making a gift of property. See Audano v. United States,
428 F.2d 251, 257 (5th Cir. 1970). For example, in Mathews, the taxpayers attempted
to justify the initial gift by claiming that (1) they wanted to isolate the property from
liability, and (2) they wanted to discourage employees from aspiring to partnership.
Mathews, 520 F.2d at 325 n.7. Both arguments were rejected by the court on the
grounds that creditors could probably attach the taxpayer's reversionary interest, and
further, that employees might covet the profits of the business regardless of the own-
ership of property. Id
62. 168 F.2d at 598.
63. In Skemp, the taxpayer was a practicing physician, who owned a two-story
office building. Id at 599. Part of the building was used for the taxpayer's medical
practice, while the other part was rented to other persons for general office purposes.
Id The trust which was created by the taxpayer was irrevocable and of 20-years
duration, unless the settlor and his wife were to both die, whereupon the trust would
terminate. Id Upon termination of the trust, the property was to be distributed to
the settlor's children. Id The taxpayer retained no significant control over the trust,
but did reserve the right to rent all or part of the building. Id
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medical building from the trustee. 64 The Seventh Circuit allowed the tax-
payer's deduction of the rental payments under the lease, basing its holding
on the fact that the legal obligation to pay rent had changed the taxpayer's
position sufficiently to imbue a valid business purpose for the execution of
the lease.65 In Brown v. Commissioner,66 the Third Circuit followed the reason-
ing of Skemp, allowing the rental deduction in a gift-leaseback transaction
which closely resembled that presented in Skemp.67 The Eighth Circuit has
recently applied the necessity of expense test in Quin/ivan v. Commissioner.68 In
holding that a business purpose need not be evidenced for the gift, the court
held that the rental payments were a result of the legally binding relation-
ship between the taxpayer and an independent trustee, and therefore, there
was no justification for inquiring into the origin of the lessor's title.6 9
This same rationale was also applied by the Tax Court in Oakes v. Com-
mirsoner,70 in which a taxpayer first transferred business property to an ir-
revocable trust over which he retained no control and subsequently leased
the property back. 7' In permitting the taxpayer to take the deduction, the
Tax Court held that it was not necessary to show the existence of a valid
business purpose for making the gift.
72
64. Id. at 599. The lease granted the entire premises to the taxpayer for a 10-
year period. Id The rent for the first two years was fixed at $500 per month; thereaf-
ter, if a disagreement arose between the taxpayer and trustee, the rent would be set
by a specified arbiter. Id The $500 rent was not alleged to be unreasonable by the
Commissioner. Id
65. Id at 600. The Skemp court stated,
There can be no question but what rent required to be paid is properly
deductible. The trustee was duty bound to exact rent of the taxpayer and
the taxpayer was legally bound to pay it, just as much as if the taxpayer
had moved across the street into the property of a third party.
Id In looking only to the record for a valid business purpose, the court rejected the
government's contention that because the transaction was voluntarily entered, it had
no valid business purpose. Id. at 599-600.
66. 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950). For a discussion of
the facts in Brown, see notes 37-38 and accompanying text supra.
67. 180 F.2d at 929-30. The court based its holding on the existence of a new
independent owner, the trustee, and the obligation of the trustee to require the pay-
ment of rent and royalties as a condition of the taxpayer's continued use of the land.
Id. at 929. Although Brown and Skemp were both decided before the four-prong test
was formulated by the Mathews court, similar criteria were used.
68. 599 F.2d at 269. For a discussion of the facts in Quinh'van, see note 39 and
accompanying text supra.
69. 599 F.2d at 273. The court also noted that the two leading cases, Brown and
Skemp, were both decided in favor of the taxpayers before Congress rewrote the 1954
version of the Code. Id at 274. In finding that the taxpayers in the present case were
entitled to the deduction, the court stated, "Since Congress was rewriting the entire
Code and made no pertinent change in the section dealing with business deductions,
we can only conclude that it approved the result in Brown and Skemp."Id at 274. For
a discussion of Brown, see note 60 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of
Skemp, see text accompanying notes 60-65 supra.
70. 44 T.C. 524 (1965).
71. Id at 526-27.
72. Id at 532. The court recognized that a taxpayer may arrange his affairs so
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The fourth and final prong of the Tax Court test requires that the tax-
payer not possess a disqualifying "equity" interest in the trust property
within the meaning of section 162(a)(3) of the Code. 73 However, neither
Congress nor the Treasury Department has defined the parameters of the
term within this section,74 and therefore, courts have been in disagreement
as to what constitutes "equity" within the meaning of the Code.
In determining the meaning of equity as applied to the gift-leaseback
situation, the major issue has been whether reversionary interests constitute
an equitable interest in the trust property.75 The Tax Court, in Mathews v.
Commirsioner,76 held that a reversionary interest in the trust is not equity
within the meaning of section 162(a)(3) because such an interest is not de-
rived from the lease agreement which is the concern of section 162(a)(3).77
as to minimize his tax liabilities by means which the law permits. Id It then stated
that "[i]rrespective of what we said regarding business purpose in our Van Zandt opin-
ion, we think that where. . . a grantor gives business property to a valid irrevocable
trust over which he retains no control and then leases it back, it is not necessary for us
to inquire as to whether there was a business reason for making the gift." Id Conse-
quently, the Tax Court has examined only the business propriety of the leaseback.
See, e.g., Richard A. Serbousek, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 479 (1977). In this case, Serbousek
and his partner transferred a medical building to a 10-year, 10-day irrevocable trust
for the benefit of their children, naming a bank as trustee. Id at 480. The medical
partnership which was composed of the taxpayers, leased back the property for use in
the medical practice. Id The Tax Court noted that the lease was not prearranged,
nor was a reversionary interest retained by the taxpayers. Id at 482-83. The Tax
Court noted that a valid business purpose was required only for the leaseback. How-
ever, the Tax Court stated that even if it had inquired into the purpose of the gift, the
taxpayers had nonetheless established a valid business purpose. Id at 483. The court
viewed as reasonable the taxpayers' concern for the potential for conflicts which
might result from their joint ownership of the land and building in the event that the
partnership dissolved. Id
73. Mathews, 61 T.C. at 19-20. See also Quin/ivan, 599 F.2d at 270. For the text of
§ 162(a)(3), see note 14 supra.
74. See I.R.C. § 162(a)(3) (1982). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.162-11, T.D. 6291
(1958).
75. See, e.g., Perry v. United States, 520 F.2d 235 (4th Cir.) (reversionary inter-
ests constitute a prohibited equity), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1975); Mathews, 61
T.C. at 12 (reversionary interests not derived from the lease itself do not constitute
equity within the meaning of § 162(a)(3)).
76. 61 T.C. at 12. In Mathews, a husband and wife created several irrevocable
ten-year and one-day trusts for the benefit of their minor children. Id at 14. In
executing these trusts, the taxpayers transferred to their attorney as trustee, four
equal undivided interests in property upon which the taxpayers operated a funeral
home. Id Upon the termination of the trust, the corpus was to be distributed to the
grantors or their estates. Id During the term of the trust, the net income was to be
distributed currently to the beneficiary. Id On or about the day the trust was exe-
cuted, the trustee leased the property to the grantor, who continued to operate the
property as a funeral home. Id The lease agreement was prearranged. Id Two
years later, the trustee and the taxpayer entered into a new one-year lease for
$14,040. Id This sum was calculated to result in a profit for the trusts after all
expenses had been taken into account. Id. Subsequently, the taxpayers transferred
their reversionary interests in the funeral home property to a new irrevocable trust
for the benefit of their four children. Id. at 14-15.
77. Id at 23. The Tax Court concluded that the tax results would be unfair if a
1983-84]
15
Olin: Taxation - Rental Deduction Standard Eased for Gift-Leaseback Tra
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1984
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
In contrast, the Fourth 78 and Fifth 79 Circuits have held that where any type
of reversionary interest in the corpus is retained by the grantor, the rental
deduction should be precluded. 80 Thus, the source of the grantor's rever-
sionary interest has divided courts in determining whether a reversionary
interest constitutes an equitable interest. 81
Where the taxpayer has transferred his reversionary interest to another,
the courts have also reached inconsistent results. For example, in Oakes v.
Commissioner,82 the Tax Court allowed a rental deduction where the grantor
had conveyed his reversionary interest to his wife, on the ground that even if
the reversionary interest constituted a prohibited equity, the taxpayer had
no such equity in the property at the time the returns were filed.8 3 However,
reversionary interest were held to constitute "equity," a result which Congress could
not have intended. Id. at 22-23. In allowing this deduction, the Mathews court noted
that if a reversionary interest retained by a grantor were held to constitute a prohib-
ited equity, an owner of a reversion to become possessory after a 99-year lease would
be precluded from deducting bona fide rental payments paid during a 10-year sub-
lease. Id at 23. The Mathews court noted that anybody else entering into this sub-
lease could have deducted the rental payments. Because the court saw no good
reason for Congress to prohibit a deduction to the reversioner alone, the deduction
was allowed. Id.
78. Perry v. United States, 520 F.2d 235 (4th Cir.), cert. den'ed, 423 U.S. 1052
(1976).
79. Van Zandt, 341 F.2d at 440.
80. See Perry v. United States, 520 F.2d 235, 237-39 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1052 (1976); Van Zandt, 341 F.2d at 440. In Perry, the court distinguished the
facts at bar from the facts in other cases where courts had allowed the rental deduc-
tion. The court noted that in the latter cases, the grantor retained no reversionary
interests in the trust corpus. Id at 239. In Van Zandt, the Fifth Circuit reversed the
district court's conclusion that the reversionary interest retained by the grantor upon
the termination of the trusts was irrelevant, and stressed that it was a factor that
should be taken into account in determining the element of business purpose. Id. at
444. The Fifth Circuit stated, "[Flactors such as . . . reversion to the settlors . . .
bear heavily on the element of the business purpose." Id.
81. See Mathews, 61 T.C. at 20. For example, if the reversionary interest is de-
rived from the lease, it would become possessory upon expiration of the lease. If the
lease terminated prior to the trust, the taxpayer would have an interest in the prop-
erty while the trust was still in existence, and thus a deduction would be disallowed.
Id.
82. 44 T.C. at 524. In Oakes, a physician and his wife constructed, on land
which they jointly owned, a building to be used in the husband's medical profession.
Id. at 525. The taxpayer then transferred title to the land and building to the Secur-
ity National Bank of Portsmouth, as trustee of an irrevocable 11-year Clifford trust,
for the benefit of his four minor children. Id. at 525-27. Two days later, the trustee
leased the building back to the taxpayer for $1,500 per year. Id. at 525. Two years
later, by deed, the taxpayer assigned his reversionary interest in the property to his
wife. Id. at 528.
83. Id. at 531. In allowing the deduction, the court did not decide whether a
reversionary interest constituted "equity." Id. The court merely acknowledged that
the reversionary interest held by the taxpayer had been relinquished on April 28,
1959. Id Because the rental deductions in dispute related to the years 1959, 1960,
and 1961, the court held that Oakes did not hold any prohibited equity in the prop-
erty at the time the returns were filed. Id.
[Vol. 29: p. 281
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in Chace v. United States,8 4 the Fifth Circuit disallowed a rental deduction
because a reversionary interest existed, even though the interest had been
transferred to the taxpayer's wife.85 The recent trend among the courts has
been to interpret the "no equity" requirement in section 162(a)(3) as al-
lowing reversionary interests in the grantor.8 6
Against this background, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
began its analysis of whether a taxpayer who gives property to his children in
trust may lease back that property for use as a professional office and deduct
the rental payments from his personal income under section 162(a)(3) of the
Code.8 7  Recognizing that it was not writing on a tabula rasa, the Rosenfeld
court remarked that it must invoke its Solomonic powers to determine which
of the divergent views reached among the circuits accorded with the law and
was the clearest course to follow.88 The court began its analysis by acknowl-
edging its acceptance of the Tax Court's Mathews four-prong test.8 9 The
court went on, however, to limit its discussion to the first and third prongs of
84. 303 F. Supp. at 513. For a discussion of the facts of Chace, see note 35 and
accompanying text supra.
85. 303 F. Supp. at 516. The grantor's "equitable interest" was found in his
right to renew the lease at the end of three-year periods. Id The district court con-
ducted a close analysis of the language of § 162(a)(3) and concluded that the type of
"equity" in property referred to in § 162(a)(3) must be one taken from the lessor, or
at least overlapping a purported ownership interest of the lessor. Id at 516. Any
ownership interests possessed by the grantor would not become possessory until after
the expiration of the lease and thus could not overlap with any ownership interests of
the lessor. Id Cf Hall v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 584, 588 (N.D.N.Y. 1962)
(taxpayer held to have equity because no one other than the grantor could acquire a
fee interest in the property).
86. See Qutnlivan, 599 F.2d at 269; Mathews, 61 T.C. at 12; Duffy v. United
States, 343 F. Supp. 4 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
87. 706 F.2d at 1277.
88. Id at 1280. While this issue had been addressed by other circuits, it was one
of first impression in the Second Circuit. The Rosenfeld court noted that the tendency
among the courts had been to allow the deduction, with the Third, Seventh, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits finding in favor of the taxpayer. Id (citing Qutithvan, 599 F.2d at
269; Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1972); Brown, 180 F.2d at 926;
Skemp, 168 F.2d at 598). The court noted that only the Fourth and Fifth Circuits
had adopted the Commissioner's view. Id at 1280 & n.4 (citing Perry, 520 F.2d at
235; Van Zandi, 341 F.2d at 440). For a discussion of Quin/'van, see notes 39-40 and
accompanying text supra. For a brief discussion of Brooke, see note 32 and accompa-
nying text supra. For a discussion of Brown, see notes 37-38 and accompanying text
supra. For a discussion of Skemp, see notes 43-44 and accompanying text supra. For a
discussion of Perry, see notes 41-42 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of
Van Zandt, see notes 56-58 and accompanying text supra.
89. 706 F.2d at 1280-83. The court of appeals quoted language from the Tax
Court:
To receive the deduction, "1) [t]he grantor must not retain substantially the
same control over the property that he had before he made the gift, 2) [t]he
leaseback should normally be in writing and must require the payment of a
reasonable rent, 3) [t]he leaseback. . . must have a bona fide business pur-
pose, [and] 4) [t]he grantor must not possess a disqualifying 'equity' in the
property within the meaning of § 162(a)(3)."
Id (quoting May v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 7, 13 (1981)).
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this analysis. 90
In analyzing the first prong, the majority relied upon the Tax Court's
finding that the trustees were independent. 9' The Rosenfeld court concluded
that the broad grants of power to the trustees, the concomitant dimunition
of Rosenfeld's rights, and the actual independence of the trustees adequately
satisfied the first element of the Mathews test.92
In the second phase of its analysis, the court reasoned that to require a
valid business purpose for the entire transaction, and not merely the lease-
back, would result in the denial of most rental deductions since few gifts
could be imbued with a valid business purpose. 93 The position that both the
gift of property to the trust and the leaseback must have a legitimate busi-
ness purpose, said the court, ignores the congressional policy inherent in the
Clifford provisions. 94 Although compliance with the requirements of a Clif-
ford trust is not dispositive of whether rental payments may be deducted, the
court stated that the close interaction between the Clifford provisions and
90. Id. at 1280. After setting forth the Mathews four-prong test, the Second Cir-
cuit observed that the second and fourth prongs of the analysis were not in conten-
tion before them. Id at 1280. The Commissioner conceded satisfaction of the second
prong, agreeing that the lease was properly executed and that the rent was reason-
able. Id. The fourth prong, which prohibits the grantor from holding any equity in
the property, was challenged by the Commissioner in the Tax Court. 43 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1353, 1356 (1980). However, the Tax Court found that under the trust agree-
ment, the taxpayer's three daughters were the sole equitable owners of the property,
and because Dr. Rosenfeld's reversionary interest was not derived from the lessor, or
under the lease, he did not possess a disqualifying equity. Id at 1356. This issue was
never raised on appeal. 706 F.2d at 1277.
91. 706 F.2d at 1280, 1281. The Rosenfeld court noted that because the Tax
Court had found the trustees to be independent, and because the Commissioner had
presented nothing to the contrary, there was no reason to reject the Tax Court's
finding. Id. at 1281.
92. Id The Second Circuit concluded that the case subjudice was distinguishable
from the earlier circuit courts' decisions in which trustees were found not to be in-
dependent. Id (citing Quinhvan, 599 F.2d at 273 n.4; Perry, 520 F.2d at 235; Van
Zandt, 341 F.2d at 440; White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398, 402 n.2 (2d Cir. 1951)). In
reaching its conclusion, the court relied on the authorization given to the trustees to
sell or mortgage the property, Rosenfeld's obligation to pay rent, and the prohibition
against Rosenfeld subletting or assigning his rights. Id.
93. 706 F.2d at 1281, 1282. The Second Circuit opined that to require a valid
business purpose for the entire transaction would be to impose too harsh a require-
ment. Id. Such a requirement would lead inevitably to a denial of the rent deduc-
tion, despite its clear business purpose, because the gift of the land was not ipsofacto a
business transaction. Id. The court also addressed the fact that many financial trans-
actions are motivated primarily by legitimate tax savings rather than valid business
concerns and agreed with Judge Learned Hand's view that a transaction does not
become unlawful merely because an individual seeks to minimize the tax conse-
quences of his activities. Id. (citing Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 411 (2d
Cir. 1957) (Hand, J., dissenting)).
94. Id. at 1281-82. In rejecting the strict requirement that both the gift and the
leaseback have a valid business purpose, the court stated, "Quite simply, Clifford
trusts are income shifting devices designed to shelter income, and we cannot lightly
overlook the legislative determination that trusts which comply with §§ 671-678 are
legitimate." Id
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section 162(a) (3) indirectly provides certain standards to be met for the crea-
tion of the trust as well as the leaseback. 95 Recognizing that Clifford trusts
are "income-shifting devices designed to shelter income," the court implied
that trusts which comply with the Clifford provisions carry a presumption of
validity.9
6
The court thus rejected an approach that would focus on the business
purpose of the transaction and instead adopted a standard which focuses on
whether there has been a "change in the economic interests of the relevant
parties. "97 The Rosenfeld court went on to examine the facts to determine the
existence or extent of a change in the economic and beneficial rights of the
taxpayer. The large amount of control given to the trustee, coupled with the
independence of the trustee, allowed the court to conclude that Rosenfeld
had changed his beneficial interest in the property by divesting both legal
title and control.98 The obligation to pay rent set forth in the lease agree-
ment changed Rosenfeld's economic interests in the property.99 The Rosen-
feld court thus concluded that the rental deduction was properly allowed
pursuant to section 162(a) (3) of the Code.l°°
95. Id at 1281. The Rosenfeld court went on to state, "Accepting the Commis-
sioner's view, . . . 'would produce a benefit only in cases where investment prop-
erty-not used in the grantor's trade or business-is placed in trust. Persons whose
assets consist largely of business property would be excluded from a tax benefit
clearly provided by Congress.' " Id at 1282 (quoting Quinhaan, 599 F.2d at 274). For
a further discussion of the interaction of § 162(a) and the Clifford provisions, see
Shurtz & Harmelink, supra note 42, at 11-14.
96. 706 F.2d at 1281. The court also noted that it would be "difficult to imagine
a case in which the establishment of such a trust could be viewed as furthering a
taxpayer's business objectives." Id
97. Id at 1282. The court based its decision on the belief that if the legal rights
and beneficial interests of the parties have changed, "there is no basis for labeling a
transaction a 'sham' and ignoring it for tax purposes." Id (citing United States v.
Ingredient Technology Corp., 698 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1983); Gilbert v. Commissioner,
248 F.2d 399, 412 (2d Cir. 1957) (Hand, J., dissenting)).
98. Id at 1282-83. The divestiture of legal title was premised upon the fact that
in the execution of the trust Rosenfeld passed legal title to the trustees. Because the
trustees were required to collect a fixed amount of rent, the majority concluded there
was no reason to believe that this legal transfer was anything but an arms-length
transaction. Id at 1282.
99. Id at 1280-81. The majority also noted that the trustees were authorized to
sell or mortgage the property, grant easements, and exercise other ownership powers.
Id In holding that Rosenfeld's economic position had changed, the court noted that
although the initial lease was co-terminous with the entire term of the trust, the
amended lease was only for a single year, renewable for one additional year. Id The
Commissioner had argued that Rosenfeld's position had not changed because he was
occupying the same premises as lessee which he previously had used as owner. Id
However, the Commissioner had conceded that a rent deduction would have been
appropriate if Rosenfeld had given the property to his children and then rented other
premises from a third party for his medical offices. Id Because in both cases Rosen-
feld would have voluntarily relinquished his right to occupy his offices rent-free and
created the need to lease other premises, the Second Circuit could see no reason to
distinguish the trust transaction from the hypothetical transaction. Id
100. Id at 1283.
1983-84]
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Judge MacMahon filed a lengthy dissent which was premised on the
belief that consideration of the economic reality, not the form of a financial
transaction, was fundamental in determining tax liability.10 ' First, the dis-
sent criticized the majority's analysis under the business purpose test. Find-
ing that it was illogical to require a business purpose for a gift, Judge
MacMahon nonetheless rejected what he believed was the majority's conten-
tion-that a business purpose was required only for the leaseback.
0 2
Rather, the dissent believed that the contemporaneous gift and leaseback
should be viewed as a single transaction. 10 3 In applying the business pur-
pose test to the facts in Rosenfeld, Judge MacMahon concluded that the de-
duction must be disallowed.' 0 4 When the gift and leaseback are viewed as a
single transaction, Judge MacMahon believed that the test to be applied was
whether a hard-headed businessman would have entered into the transac-
tion. Judge MacMahon concluded that the under facts of Rosenfeld, the
transaction failed this test. 10 5 In discussing the business purpose test, Judge
101. Id at 1283 (MacMahon, J., dissenting). Judge MacMahon agreed with a
dissent by Judge Learned Hand:
The Income Tax Act imposes liabilities upon taxpayers based upon
their financial transactions, and it is of course true that the payment of tax
itself is a financial transaction. If however, the taxpayer enters into a transaction
that does not appreciably affect his beneficial interest, except to reduce his tax, the law
will disregard it; for we cannot suppose that it was part of the purpose of the
act to provide an escape from the liabilities that it sought to impose.
Id (quoting Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 411 (2d Cir. 1957) (Hand, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis supplied by the court)).
102. Id Remarking that the majority misunderstood the government's conten-
tion, Judge MacMahon stated that "[i]t is illogical to require a business purpose for a
gift, and this is not the government's argument. The government argues that the
contemporaneous gift and leaseback be viewed as one transaction and that the busi-
ness purpose rule be applied to the taxpayer's claimed deduction for the 'business
expense' of the resulting rental payments." Id Therefore, he argued, the majority's
characterization of the government's argument as requiring a business purpose for
the gift, and a business purpose for the leaseback was incorrect. Id at 1283-84 (Mac-
Mahon, J., dissenting).
103. Id. The dissent argued that the facts at bar and the relevant legal standards
compelled a single transaction approach. Id. This argument was premised on the
fact that the gift and leaseback were executed as one transaction. Id. Judge MacMa-
hon stated as follows:
"Gift and retained control must be regarded as inseparable parts of a
single transaction, especially since it was only in their sum total that they
had any reality in regard to the conduct of [taxpayer's] business. To isolate
them . . . is to hide business reality behind paper pretense."
Id at 1285 (MacMahon, J., dissenting) (quoting White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398,
400 (2d Cir. 1951)).
104. Id at 1283 (MacMahon, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 1287. (MacMahon, J., dissenting) The dissent argued that a hard-
headed businessman would not sign a lease for an office he already owned and occu-
pied. Id. A hard-headed businessman, he asserted, would not incur unnecessary ex-
penses. Id. The dissent also reasoned that Dr. Rosenfeld remained liable on the
mortgage so that the gift would not be subject to any mortgage liability, and thus,
would be of greater value to his daughters. Id No hard-headed businessman, argued
the dissent, would have remained liable on the mortgage. Id.
The dissent also attacked the majority's finding that the $14,000 rental pay-
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MacMahon also criticized the majority's rationale that consideration of
"other factors" allowed the court to apply the business test only to the lease-
back.U°6 The other factor relied upon by the Rosenfeld court was the validity
of the trust. The dissent remarked that legislative history indicated that this
factor should be irrelevant in determining the validity of a section 162(a)
deduction.1 0 7 The dissent concluded that the taxpayer had begun paying
rent to the trust in order to be certain that his purpose of a lifetime gift to his
children would be fulfilled; that is, there was simply no business purpose to
this transaction.108 Moreover, the dissent argued that the four-prong test
should never be utilized because a factual inquiry into the taxpayer's scheme
years after its implementation made it more difficult for taxpayers to plan
their affairs. '0 9
Judge MacMahon also discussed Rosenfeld's retention of control over
the property and argued that even if a bifurcated approach to the gift and
leaseback were adopted, the deduction should still be denied because control
was not relinquished by the execution of the trust. 110 Judge MacMahon
stated that because the trustees, Rosenfeld's advisors, had planned the entire
scheme without inquiring about other tenants while allowing Dr. Rosenfeld
ments were reasonable. Judge MacMahon argued that because the $14,000 figure
was based upon the use of all three floors as office space, and because Rosenfeld had
used one floor for storage, he had deducted a rental expense in excess of the amount
required. Id at 1284 (MacMahon, J., dissenting). Judge MacMahon asserted that
the payment of rent in excess of that which is reasonable was based upon Rosenfeld's
desire to increase the value of the gift to his daughters and lower the family's taxes.
Id Judge MacMahon stated, "The fact rent negotiations produced 'reasonable' re-
sults is totally irrelevant. Any bargaining is simply not at arm's length, because any
rent exceeding expenses stays in the. . . family.'" Id (quoting Mathews, 520 F.2d at
325). Because this rental amount was not reasonable, the dissent argued that the
payments amounted to an assignment of $14,000 of the taxpayer's income to the
trust. Id This assignment, noted the dissent, would not be recognized under con-
temporary tax law standards. Id (citing White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir.
1951)).
106. Id at 1285 (MacMahon, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that rather than
using the validity of the Clifford trust to illustrate "one of these 'other factors,' " the
majority used it as the only factor, and did not point to any other transaction for
which a § 162(a) deduction is allowed without a business purpose. Id The dissent
criticized the majority for offering the validity of the trust as the sole other factor. Id
The dissent also criticized the majority's view that if the gift is a "sham," the deduc-
tion is denied, and if the gift is valid, the deduction is allowed, arguing that this
reliance upon compliance with the Clifford trust section is incorrect. Id
107. Id at 1285-86 (MacMahon, J., dissenting). In rejecting the majority's ra-
tionale, Judge MacMahon relied on a Senate Finance Committee Report which, in
the context of a discussion regarding Clifford trusts, stated, "fThis subpart also has no
application in determining the right of a grantor to deductions for payments to a trust under a
transfer and leaseback arrangement. " Id (citing S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprintedin 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4621, 5006 (emphasis supplied by the
dissent); Perg, 520 F.2d at 235).
108. Id at 1287 (MacMahon, J., dissenting).
109. Id The dissent then suggested that "[a] holding that rental payments aris-
ing from gift-leaseback transactions are not deductible simply would require taxpay-
ers to find other, less hypocritical means of avoiding their taxes." Id
110. Id
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to instruct them as to whether to make improvements, the transaction
amounted to "passive acquiescence to the will of the donor."11 '
In analyzing the decision in Rosenfeld, it is submitted that the Second
Circuit properly declined to adopt the position that compliance with the
Clifford provisions of the Code requires a finding that the gift-leaseback
transaction is valid. It is suggested that this finding is correct in light of the
report of the Senate Finance Committee, which states that the Clifford pro-
visions have no application in determining the right of a grantor to take
deductions for payments to a trust under a transfer and leaseback arrange-
ment.' 12 After rejecting an approach which focused solely on the Clifford
provisions, the Rosenfeld court turned to case law for guidance. 1 "3 Following
the lead of other circuit courts, the Second Circuit correctly invoked as its
touchstone the test set forth by the Tax Court in May and Mathews." 4
After adopting the control, writing, and equity prongs of the Mathews
and May tests, the Rosenfeld court proceeded to reject the existing approaches
to the business purpose prong.1 15 In rejecting the existing approaches, the
court adopted its own standard of review, requiring a taxpayer to substan-
tially change his legal and beneficial interests. 1 6 However, it is submitted
that although the Rosenfeld court may have attempted a compromise be-
tween the two extreme tests, in fact, it has set forth a standard of review that
appears no more stringent than the bifurcated approach.1 7 In doing so, the
111. Id. (quoting Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 748 (1949)). The
dissent also noted that the lease granted Dr. Rosenfeld the right to build additions to
the building. Id This, the dissent argued, is an indicia of ownership. Id. Also, the
excessive rental payments made by Dr. Rosenfeld constituted a premium which the
taxpayer was willing to pay because he was more than a co-tenant. Id at 1286-87
(MacMahon, J., dissenting). The dissent also rejected the majority's argument that
Dr. Rosenfeld transferred his reversionary interest to his wife, since the question is
one of control and not one of equity. Id Finally, the dissent discussed the fact that
when the trust was amended, Dr. Rosenfeld's daughter was appointed trustee along
with an attorney. Id at 1288. (MacMahon, J., dissenting) The amendment pro-
vided that a majority vote was needed, but required that Barbara Rosenfield be
among the majority. Id Thus, the dissent concluded that the grantor's daughter was
not only a trustee, but was also vested with veto power. Id The dissent argued that
Dr. Rosenfeld's discretion as to whether improvements should be made, the payment
of all the expenses of the land except real estate taxes and structural repairs, the lack
of competitors when the lease was executed, and the installation of his daughter as
one of the trustees, were indicative of the fact that Rosenfeld's control over the build-
ing had not substantially changed after the gift was made. Id. Thus, concluded
Judge MacMahon, Dr. Rosenfeld was " 'the actual enjoyer and owner of the prop-
erty.' " Id (quoting White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398, 402 (2d Cir. 1951)).
112. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprnted in 1954 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4621, 5006; 26 C.F.R. § 1.671-1(c) (1982).
113. 706 F.2d at 1280.
114. Id
115. Id at 1282.
116. Id. The court reasoned that "if the legal and beneficial interests of a tax-
payer have changed, there is no basis for labeling a transaction a 'sham' and ignoring
it for tax purposes." Id (citing Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957)
(Hand, J., dissenting)).
117. Under the bifurcated approach, a taxpayer must only imbue a valid busi-
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Second Circuit has not only failed to suggest a more workable standard, but
it has also added further ambiguity to an already confused area., 18 Al-
though the language of the new test may suggest a compromise standard, the
factors upon which the Rosenfeld court relied to determine whether its new
standard had been satisfied should have already been considered in deter-
mining whether the grantor relinquished control. The Second Circuit
looked to such factors as the broad grant of power to the trustees, Rosenfeld's
legal obligation to pay rent, the independence of the trustees, and the
dimunition of Rosenfeld's rights. 1 9 However, a review of earlier decisions,
as well as the Rosenfeld decision itself, demonstrates that these factors should
already have been considered under the control prong. 120 Thus, the new
standard, although different in form, in substance is repetition of the analysis
applicable in analyzing control.
Judge MacMahon, in dissent, correctly noted that the majority strug-
gled to avoid application of the business purpose test by stating that other
factors must be considered.1 2 1 However, as the dissent noted, the only
"other factor" relied upon by the majority was the validity of the trust. 122
Consequently, it is submitted that this new test adds no further inquiry into
the position of the parties than does the test used to determine relinquish-
ment of control.
It is further submitted that in the gift-leaseback transaction context, a
test which requires a taxpayer to change his beneficial and legal position is,
in reality, no test at all. By virtue of the fact that a taxpayer has transferred
legal title of property to a Clifford trust, he will always change his legal
position. Furthermore, because a taxpayer becomes obligated to pay rent as
a result of the gift-leaseback transaction, his economic interests will have
changed as well. Thus, the Rosenfeld court apparently has adopted a test in
ness purpose for the leaseback transaction. Thus, where the taxpayer's business re-
quires the use of office space, the taxpayer will prevail and the rental deduction will
be allowed. Similarly, under the new test, a taxpayer will always prevail because
gift-leaseback transactions, by definition, require a taxpayer to change his legal and
beneficial interests. For a discussion of the bifurcated approach to the business pur-
pose prong, see text accompanying notes 59-72 supra.
118. As a result of the new test adopted by the Second Circuit, a third standard
has been added under which a court may determine whether a rental deduction
should be allowed. In attempting to reach a compromise and alleviate the existing
inconsistency among the courts, the Rosenfeld court has muddied the waters by ad-
ding a third test, which arguably goes no further than the bifurcated approach.
119. 706 F.2d at 1282.
120. Id at 1281. For a discussion of earlier decisions which have considered
these factors in analyzing control, see notes 32-47 supra.
121. 706 F.2d at 1285 (MacMahon, J., dissenting).
122. Id The dissent also noted that this sole "other factor" relied upon by the
majority should not be considered at all, because reliance on the validity of the trust
does not withstand analysis. Id The dissent correctly supported this argument by
citing to the legislative history of the Clifford provisions which prohibits application
of compliance with these provisions in determining the validity of rental deductions.
Id at 1285-86 (MacMahon, J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4621, 5006).
1983-84]
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which a taxpayer who has entered a gift-leaseback transaction will always
prevail. In attempting to differentiate between a sham and economic reality,
the Rosenfdd court has set forth a test which itself substantively lacks eco-
nomic reality.
It is difficult to ascertain whether the Rosenfeld decision will provide the
impetus for Congress to intervene and establish a uniform standard so that
all taxpayers will be treated alike. However, the decision, which adds a third
approach to an already confused area, makes it incumbent upon Congress to
resolve the uncertainty especially in light of the Supreme Court's repeated
refusal to consider the question. 123
Sherry R. Oh'n
123. The Supreme Court has consistently refused to grant certiorari on cases
presenting this issue. See, e.g., Quinlivan v. Commissioner, 599 F.2d 269 (8th Cir.),
cert. denz'ed, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.),
cert. denkd, 382 U.S. 814 (1965); Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950).
24
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol29/iss1/8
